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Trial Tactics

Child Testimony and the
Right to Present a Defense
BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG

H

arris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609 (7th Cir.
2012), is a reminder of how important
a child’s testimony can be in a criminal
prosecution. Trial judges generally have considerable discretion in ruling on the competency of
child witnesses, but Harris indicates that the Sixth
Amendment compulsory process right and the due
process right to present a defense can limit that discretion to some extent.
Nicole Harris was convicted of murdering her
four-year-old son. She lost her direct appeal to an
Illinois appellate court and sought federal habeas corpus relief. A district judge denied her petition, but the
Seventh Circuit reversed and held that Harris’s Sixth
Amendment right to present a defense was violated
by the state trial judge’s exclusion of the testimony
of the defendant’s other son, who was five years old
when his brother died and six at the time of trial.
The court also held that defense trial counsel’s serious errors in the competency hearing that resulted in
the son’s exclusion deprived Harris of the effective
assistance of counsel, because counsel was not ready
for the hearing, had not interviewed the son, and did
not secure the presence of a witness who would have
shown that the son’s recollections of what happened
where consistent and credible. The discussion here is
limited to the admissibility of the child’s testimony
and does not address the scope of habeas corpus or
the ineffective assistance part of the case.

The Facts

The 23-year-old Harris lived in a Chicago apartment with her boyfriend, Sta-Von Dancy, and their
two sons, five-year-old Diante and four-year-old
Jaquari. One afternoon Harris and Dancy went to
the laundromat across the street, left the boys alone
for approximately 40 minutes, and told them not
to leave the apartment. Harris returned to check
on the boys while clothes were drying and found
Diante in the hallway and Jaquari playing outside.
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She yelled at the children and ordered them to go to
their bedroom, where Jaquari began crying. Harris
returned to the laundromat and Dancy went back to
the apartment and took a nap after speaking to the
children in their bedroom.
Dancy awakened to find Jaquari lying on the bedroom floor, unresponsive and blue in the face with
an elastic band from a fitted sheet wrapped nearly
10 times around his neck. After Dancy attempted
unsuccessfully to resuscitate Jaquari, he lifted the
child and ran outside, where he met Harris returning
again from the laundromat. With Harris driving their
car, Dancy continued CPR in in the back seat, and
they called 911. An ambulance met them and took
Jaquari to a hospital. They went back to the apartment for Diante, and returned to the hospital to hear
Jaquari pronounced dead.
Chicago police officers arrived and questioned Harris and Dancy, who agreed to accompany officers to
the police station for further questioning. Detectives
interviewed the two separately before continuing
their investigation at the apartment, where forensic
technicians collected the elastic band and the bed sheet
along with a telephone cord that they suspected might
have been used to strangle Jaquari. The detectives,
who learned from neighbors that Harris had struck
her children with a belt that day, returned to the station and confronted her with discrepancies between
what she and the neighbors said. The detectives would
later claim that after about 15 minutes of questioning,
Harris started to cry and burst out with “I wrapped the
phone cord around Jaquari’s neck and then I wrapped
the elastic band from the bed sheet around his neck to
make it look like an accident.” (Id. at 614.)
After the detectives read her Miranda rights, Harris recanted her initial unwarned confession. She was
kept overnight in a holding cell, took an inconclusive
polygraph examination, and then confessed again and
said that she strangled Jaquari with the elastic band.
A prosecutor came to the station and obtained a videotape of Harris’s confession, in which she stated that
she had struck Jaquari with a belt when she came home
from the laundromat and wrapped the band around
his neck to stop him from crying before returning to
the laundromat. The second confession made no mention of the phone cord, which an autopsy determined
was not used to cause Jaquari’s death.

The Trial

At trial, it was agreed that Jaquari died from asphyxiation as a result of having the elastic band from a
fitted bed sheet wound around his neck, and that
Diante was in the top bunk of the bed he shared with
his brother when Jaquari died. The prosecution relied
on the second confession and sought to prove that
Harris became angry when Jaquari would not stop
crying and strangled him with the elastic band. The
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defense theory was that Jaquari accidentally asphyxiated himself while Harris was at the laundromat.
The state relied heavily on Harris’s videotaped
confession as well as the testimony of the doctor
who conducted the autopsy. The doctor originally
concluded that the death was an accident, but
changed his opinion after learning of Harris’s confession and that traces of blood were found on the
linen on Jaquari’s bed.
Harris testified on her own behalf. She admitted scolding the children and sending them to their
room, but denied striking them. She testified that
when she came back from the laundromat the second time she met Dancy outside holding Jaquari.
Harris, who stated on the videotape that she had
been treated well by police who made no promises
or threats, also testified that she made the videotaped
confession after 27 hours of coercive interrogation
in which she was deprived of food and water, threatened, and promised leniency if she cooperated.
Dancy testified that he had previously seen
Jaquari wrapping the sheet’s elastic band around
his neck. Other family members testified that Jaquari
was curious and playful, including an aunt who testified that she once saw the boy put a plastic laundry
bag over his face.
Diante, who was six at the time of the trial, was the key
witness for the defense but was not permitted to testify.

Diante’s Interview

An investigator, Dr. Ale Levy with the Child Advocacy Center, interviewed Diante the day after the
death with a police detective present taking notes.
The center partners with the Chicago Police Department, the state’s attorney, and the Department of
Child and Family Services. The officer’s notes indicated that Diante contradicted Harris as to her claim
not to have hit Jaquari and said that Harris spanked
both boys when she found them outside the apartment and caused Jaquari to bleed when she hit him
with a belt on the leg. The notes also indicated, however, that Diante clearly described an accident in
which “Jaquari was playing [and] wrapped elastic
around neck from blue sheet,” and Diante was “playing Spiderman game” and “couldn’t help Jaquari get
out of his sheet.” (Id. at 616 (alteration in original).)

Competency Hearing

The prosecution sought to exclude Diante as a
witness. The trial judge conducted a competency
hearing and began by misapplying Illinois law, which
imposes the burden of showing incompetence on the
party challenging a witness, and imposing the burden on the defense to show Diante’s competence.
Defense counsel called Diante as a witness and
had him spell his name, state his age, give his birthday, list the cities where he had lived, name his

teacher, and describe the color of certain objects.
The trial judge asked him if he knew the difference
between a truth and a lie and Diante said, “Telling
a lie, you might get in trouble. Telling the truth, you
might get a star.” (Id. at 617.)
Diante said that on the day Jaquari died, Diante
was with Jaquari and was “Playing my game.” He said,
“Jaquari was playing with that string and wrapping
it around his neck.” (Id.) He testified that the string
was the band from the blue sheet and that only the
two boys were in the room when Jaquari wrapped the
sheet’s elastic around his neck. Diante answered “yes”
when asked by the prosecutor if he remembered telling
a Department of Child and Family Services investigator that he was asleep when Jaquari “got hurt.”
Defense counsel asked Diante whether he knew
“the difference between real people and cartoons.” (Id.)
Diante said he did and named “Scooby-Doo, Tom and
Jerry” as examples of cartoons. The prosecutor picked
up this line of questioning but, as the Seventh Circuit
described the prosecutor’s questions, “the prosecutor
shifted to use the word ‘real’ differently” and “[t]his
shift caused some confusion”:
Q: Okay. Now, you were talking about some
cartoons a couple of minutes ago. You were
talking about Scooby-Doo, and cartoons and
real things, right?
A: (Nodding.)
Q: Do you think Spiderman is real?
A: Yes.
Q: And have you ever seen Spiderman in
person?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. And what did you say to Spiderman
when you saw him in person?
A: Nothing.
Q: You didn’t say anything to him?
A: (Nodding.)
Q: Have you ever seen Scooby-Doo?
A: No.
Q: Okay. Is Scooby-Doo real?
A: No.
Q: Okay. Scooby-Doo is what?
A: A movie.
Q: Okay. And how about The Hulk? Is The
Hulk real or is he something else?
A: Something else.
....
Q: Okay. Let’s see. How about Santa Claus, is
Santa Claus real?
A: Yes.
Q: And have you ever seen Santa Claus in
person?
A: No.
(Id.)
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The prosecutor also had Diante say that he
believed the tooth fairy was real. The Seventh Circuit concluded that Diante thought the prosecutor
was asking whether Spiderman and Santa Claus
were animated or human characters, not cartoons. If
so, his answers were true and were in part explicable
by Dancy’s trial testimony that Diante was familiar
with Spiderman live-action films. The prosecutor
also asked Diante about Jaquari:

The Seventh Circuit explained the importance of
this testimony:

The Seventh Circuit, relying on the conclusions of
Dr. Robert Galatzer-Levy, a child psychiatrist who
conducted a competency assessment of Diante six
months after the trial, found that Diante was saying “limo” rather than “rainbow.” The court also
observed that during Galatzer-Levy’s assessment,
Diante described a church as a “church with heaven”
and a courtroom as a “church with the judge.” (Id.)
The Seventh Circuit found that this was consistent
with Diante’s testimony that other living family
members were present “in heaven” in the following
exchange that took on great importance for the judge:

Because this account involves both of
Diante’s brothers, we cannot be completely
certain whether the “He” in the penultimate line refers to Junior or to Jaquari. The
difference bears on both the competency
determination and Harris’s guilt or innocence.
If the speaker was Junior, Diante was describing what his surviving brother Junior had told
him at the wake or funeral: Junior said that
Harris had killed Jaquari, and Diante was
telling the judge that was wrong. The testimony is entirely different if Diante meant that
Jaquari appeared to his brothers from beyond
the grave to accuse their mother of killing
him. The first reading is supported by the fact
that Diante said, “He said, my mommy killed
my brother,” not “He said, my mommy killed
me,” or “He said, my mommy killed him.”
The best support for the second reading is
that Jaquari was the brother the prosecutor
had last mentioned (three questions earlier),
but it’s safe to say that six-year-old Diante
was not precise with pronouns and antecedents. Given the ambiguity, one would have
expected counsel or the court to ask some
follow-up questions to learn what Diante
meant, at least before assuming that he was
reporting a visit from beyond the grave. But
nothing more was said on the subject. And
not only did the court assume that this testimony referred to a communication with
Jaquari’s spirit, but it relied heavily on his
report of this supposed “fantasy” to find that
Diante was not competent to testify.
(Id. at 618–19.)

Q: Who else was in heaven with him?
A: My brother and my cousin.
Q: Okay. What’s your brother’s name?
A: Junior.
Q: Okay. And he was there, too?
A: (Nodding.)
Q: And did you talk to Jaquari then?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: Did he say anything to you?
A: Yes.
Q: What did he say to you?
A: He . . . he said, my mommy killed my
brother, and my mommy didn’t.
Q: Okay. Now, I want to ask you a little bit
about your bedroom. . . .
(Id.)

Defense counsel wanted to call Dr. Ale Levy and
informed the judge that he had subpoenaed her. The
doctor was not present, and ultimately defense counsel chose not to fight for a continuance to have her
testify (the witness, according to the Seventh Circuit,
who would have shown that Diante’s recollections of
what happened were consistent and credible). The
prosecution called a second Child Advocacy Center
investigator, Karen Wilson, who interviewed Diante
the day after Levy interviewed him, to testify that
Diante stated that Scooby-Doo, Spiderman, and
Santa Claus were real persons.
The trial judge ruled that Diante was incompetent. The judge observed that Illinois provides only
two grounds for disqualification as incompetent:
inability to express oneself so as to be understood,
or inability to understand the duty to tell the truth.

Q: You told me earlier that you have seen
Jaquari in heaven, right?
A: Yes.
Q: And do you remember the last time you
saw Jaquari in heaven?
....
A: Where I was in the rainbow.
Q: When you were in the what?
A: In the rainbow.
Q: “In the rainbow”? You were in the rainbow?
A: Uhn-uhn. No, in the car.
Q: Oh, in the car. And you saw Jaquari in
heaven then?
A: (Nodding.)
(Id. at 618.)
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The judge said that he was unpersuaded that Diante
understood the duty to tell the truth. The judge also
expressed doubts as to whether Diante was able to
distinguish reality from fantasy. The judge therefore
disqualified him on both grounds. In postconviction
proceedings, the trial judge conceded error in placing
the burden of showing competency on the defense
but held that the same result would have obtained
had the state borne the burden.

Direct Appeal and the Seventh Circuit

The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the conviction.
It found no abuse of discretion in the ruling finding
Diante incompetent. Amazingly, it also held that
even if the trial judge abused discretion, any error
was harmless because Diante’s testimony would
not have influenced the verdict. The court failed to
address Harris’s Sixth Amendment compulsory process argument.
The Seventh Circuit described both the Sixth
Amendment right of a defendant “to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor” and
the Fourteenth Amendment due process right to
present a meaningful and complete criminal defense.
(Id. at 626.) It summed up the law as establishing
that exclusion of defense evidence abridges a defendant’s constitutional rights where the restriction is
arbitrary or disproportionate to the interests it is
designed to serve and the evidence implicates a sufficiently weighty interest of the accused.
The Seventh Circuit found that Diante’s testimony was critical, material, noncumulative, and
uncontradicted. It rejected the state appellate court’s
analysis that Diante’s testimony lacked significant
probative force because he said he was asleep when
Jaquari died. It also rejected the argument that Harris’s videotaped confession meant that the evidence
for the state was overwhelming and observed that
the jury had reasons to question the reliability of the
confession, including the fact that her initial confession was inconsistent with the physical evidence.
The Seventh Circuit summarized Diante’s proffered testimony as follows:
Diante was by no means a perfect witness. He
said that he believed Santa Claus and Spiderman were real and that he had seen Jaquari “in
heaven.” He also told [Child Advocacy Center] investigators Levy and Wilson that he had
been asleep when Jaquari got hurt, which was
superficially inconsistent with the defense’s
claim that Diante witnessed Jaquari’s death.
(Nobody asked him to explain the difference.)
And he did not respond to the court’s satisfaction to two of its questions: first, whether he
could “remember anything else that happened

that day” (he said no); and second, whether
he had “spoken before with any of the people
who are here today before you came to court.”
(Diante again said no, even though he had previously spoken to the prosecutor).
But none of these responses were explored by the
court or counsel with even minimal follow-up.
Had there been any, the court should have gained
the same insights that Dr. Galatzer-Levy did:
that Diante believed Santa and Spiderman were
real to the extent they were not cartoons; that by
“heaven,” [Diante] probably meant “church”;
that he did not realize that he witnessed Jaquari
die because he did not understand death; and
that he remembered many details from the day
of Jaquari’s death. Moreover, even if like many
six-year-olds Diante believed that these mythical characters were real, such imaginings were
not commingled with his memory of the day of
Jaquari’s death and would not have hindered his
ability to tell what he saw.
(Id. at 636–37.)
The court found that the larger problem was with
the trial judge’s expectations of a child witness:
The bigger issue, and the trial court’s more glaring failure at the competency hearing, was its
unrealistic expectations for a six-year-old witness. As Illinois courts have emphasized, “[i]t
is not incumbent upon a child to give perfect
answers to questions asked during the competency determination or at trial to be deemed a
competent witness.” A child’s belief in Santa
Claus or Spiderman does not make the child’s
testimony about his real-life experiences unreliable. Nor does Diante’s negative response to
the court’s general inquiry if he remembered
anything else from the day. Such a broad,
open-ended question in a hearing or deposition often confuses adults who have already
been testifying about what they remember. It
was unlikely to elicit a detailed, substantive
account of the day’s events from a six-yearold, especially when posed by a stranger in
a black robe. Likewise, the trial court’s question, “Have you spoken before with any of the
people who are here today before you came to
court?” was both compound and ambiguous
enough that many adults might have trouble
answering it. Was the judge asking whether
Diante had ever spoken before with anyone
present at court that day? Or whether he had
spoken that day with anyone present before
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coming to court? And how many people were
in the courtroom? The answer says nothing
probative about Diante’s reliability as a witness. There was no follow-up to make sure he
even understood the question.
(Id. at 637–38 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).)
The court added a footnote pointing out substantial authority supporting its observation that “[a]
child’s belief in Santa Claus or Spiderman does not
make the child’s testimony about his real-life experiences unreliable.” (Id. at 637.)
The bottom line for the court was this:
If the Compulsory Process Clause is to be more
than a “dead letter,” it demands that courts recognize that the exclusion of defense evidence
can have constitutional consequences beyond
the rules of evidence. Here, state courts overlooked the Sixth Amendment significance of
Diante’s testimony. By disqualifying Diante from
taking the stand, the trial court deprived Harris

of evidence that was favorable and material to
her defense, and on the evidence before it, the
exclusion was “arbitrary or disproportionate”
to the interests served by the competency rule.
The exclusion violated Harris’s right to present
a complete defense under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
(Id. at 639 (citation omitted).)

Lessons

Children do not have to be perfect witnesses to be
competent to testify in a criminal trial.
When a child is a critical witness in a criminal
prosecution, it is vitally important that the questions presented to the child be clear and that the
child understand the questions.
When a child is the only witness to an event, it
is especially important that the child’s testimony be
heard and that the trier of fact decide whether the
child’s testimony is reliable.
The fact that a defendant has confessed does not
automatically mean that the confession is reliable or
more important than other evidence that casts doubt
on the reliability of the confession. n
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